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2In early 2016 NLGN, in partnership with 
Weightmans, held a roundtable in Leeds 
to discuss the status and progress of 
devolution deals. Leaders and Chief 
Executives were brought together from 
combined authorities and a number of 
metropolitan and district councils. In 
this paper we set out the themes of the 
discussion and provide context and analysis 
on the progress of the devolution agenda. 
HISTORIC CONTEXT OF 
DEVOLUTION IN ENGLAND
The appropriate tier from which to govern 
in the UK has been a source of contention 
for decades. As early as 1912, Winston 
Churchill decided to sketch a plan for a 
complete system of federalism in Great 
Britain. Lancashire, Yorkshire, the Midlands, 
London, and other districts would all have 
their separate parliaments.1
Over 100 years later, the constitutional 
question about the geographies of power 
and decision-making across Great Britain 
has not gone away2. Although devolving 
powers to English regions and areas is not 
a new idea, the political urgency for more 
English devolution has increased following 
1  See http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/14th-
september-1912/2/mr-winston-churchills-speech-at-
dundee-on-wednesda.
2  Jackson, A. (2014), Shamrock and Saltire: Irish 
Home Rule and the Scottish Referendum, 1914 – 2014 
Accessed, 24.02.2016: http://blog.oup.com/2014/09/
shamrock-saltire-irish-home-rule-scottish-referen-
dum-1914-2014/.
the Scottish independence referendum which 
sparked intense debate surrounding who gets 
what from whom, who contributes to UK plc3 
and in what ways. Today there is an added 
urban dimension, with the focus of devolution 
being predominantly city-led. England’s core 
cities have consistently performed below the 
national average in terms of GDP per capita. 
By comparison eight of the largest German 
cities outside Berlin performed above the 
national GDP per capita4. This latest round of 
devolution is an attempt to change this. 
English regionalism has a long history, most 
notably in historic county rivalries. But in 
terms of governance, the closest England 
came to regional devolution was the creation 
of the ten Government Office Regions under 
John Major’s Conservative government in 
1994. These were enhanced in 1998 under 
the Labour Government with the addition 
of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) 
for each region and regional chambers with 
members appointed by local authorities.
The move towards English regional 
government culminated in the 2004 
referendum in the North East. When this 
failed, the debate shifted towards city regions, 
reflecting a growing international debate 
about the importance of urban centres to 
overall national growth. Moves towards city 
regional working began under Labour but 
3  Moodey, G. & O’ Sullivan, P. (2014) ‘The impact of 
the Scottish Independence Referendum on Devolution 
and Governance in the United Kingdom’ Knowledge 
Exchange Seminar Series.
4  IPPR North (2014) Decentralisation Decade p.22
3accelerated considerably with the arrival of 
the coalition government in 2010. 
Britain lacks a layer of government that sits 
between the central state and the locality: 
there is no equivalent of the German Lande, 
the Australian states or the Spanish regions. 
This has made it harder to devolve substantial 
economic power. Individually, councils are too 
small to effectively manage policy areas such 
as transport, but the nation state has proven 
too large and remote for the job to the benefit 
of local people. It is now hoped that that the 
great cities (and, perhaps, shires) will take 
on new functions which will enable them to 
manage the process of development.
THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF 
DEVOLUTION DEALS
Today’s devolution deals cannot be seen in 
isolation from what has come before them. 
They are informed by an evolution of thinking 
surrounding governance in England. More 
recently however, it can be said that there 
are three major building blocks that have 
helped construct the policy architecture of 
devolution, following the abolition of the 
RDAs. These are the establishment of Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), city deals and 
combined authorities. Each have contributed 
significantly to the enabling institutional 
framework that allows for the development of 
current devolution deals.
The first of these was the establishment of 
the LEPs. These were set up in 2011 by the 
Department of Business Innovation and Skills 
as voluntary partnerships between businesses 
and local authorities. It is thought that LEPs 
provide a more locally specific understanding 
of places and can deliver better outcomes. 
Lord Heseltine’s ‘No Stone Unturned’ report 
recommended that funds should be given to 
LEPs to help drive growth in their areas and 
this led to the establishment of Growth Funds 
for LEPs5. As such, LEPs partially replaced 
the RDAs in terms of their functional role as 
enablers of local growth.
City deals were announced in 2011 and 
offered additional funding and powers to 
the UK’s 8 ‘Core Cities’ outside London in 
recognition that city-regions need greater 
decision-making powers to unleash and 
support economic growth. This was followed 
by a second wave of deals to a further 20 
cities. The bidding process and institutional 
environment helped cities build up capacity 
that would help when it came to writing 
devolution bids.
The last building block of devolution 
deals was the establishment of combined 
authorities. These are associations of local 
authorities, which work together in a strategic 
partnership to direct joint goals across city-
regions. There are currently five combined 
authorities – not all with devolution deals – 
the first being Greater Manchester, formed 
5 Lord Michael Heseltine (2013) No Stone Unturned: in 
pursuit of growth. Crown Copyright.
4in 2011. Combined authorities provided a 
governance structure and a framework for 
receiving core cities funding. As of the 2011 
Localism Act, combined authorities were 
granted the general power of competence, 
transferring powers from the Department of 
Communities and Local Government, directly 
to authorities. Such places now have an 
integrated transport authority, an economic 
prosperity board and can borrow from the EU 
Investment Bank to fund projects in line with 
EU development goals.
Despite the combination of LEPs, devolution 
deals and the establishment of combined 
authorities, England remains a highly 
centralised state. Very little decision-
making and fund-raising power was actually 
transferred. For example, sub-national 
taxation in the UK comprises only 1.7% 
of GDP, compared to 5% in France and 
15% in Sweden. In cities, around 95%of 
all taxes raised in a city go back to central 
government to be re-distributed. Compared 
to English cities the level of taxes controlled 
at the local or regional level is about 10 
times greater in Canada, 7.5 times greater 
in the US, 7 times in Sweden, almost 6times  
in Germany, and over 5 times greater across 
the OECD on average.6
As part of its response to ‘the English 
question’ that arose after the Scottish 
independence referendum, the government 
6  City Centred (2016) ‘FAQs’ Accessed on 24.02.2016: 
http://www.citycentred.co.uk/faq/
announced that devolution would be given 
to combined authorities. Authorities had to 
present “devolution bids” to government 
and go into negotiation about the terms and 
conditions of these. This was made easier 
due to the institutional frameworks and 
previous capacities built up from LEPs, city 
deals and the pre-existing powers of the 
combined authorities. 
DEVOLUTION DEALS: THE 
CURRENT SITUATION
At the time of writing there are currently eight 
deals that have been signed, with Greater 
Manchester having the deepest and most far-
reaching reforms, including devolution of its 
NHS budget.
There is a great variation amongst the agreed 
deals. Major issues that must be addressed 
stem in part from the legacies of the already 
established frameworks, but are also related 
to public service reform, governance models 
and lingering geographical inconsistencies. 
Many questions persist and were central 
to our discussion; Are devolution deals 
inherently biased towards cities? What 
can rural two-tier areas do to achieve 
successful bids? How do the bids tie in 
with governance structures? Does everyone 
need a metro mayor, or are chairs more 
relevant? And what levels of fiscal devolution 
can be achieved to realistically deliver the 
agreements in the deals?  
5GEOGRAPHIES
Every devolution deal is being created in a 
complex governance landscape including 
LEPs and various types of local authorities. 
In addition there is the added complexity 
of economic geography as measured 
in the Travel To Work Areas (TTWAs).  
Published by the ONS, these map the ‘real’ 
spatial economy of urban areas based on 
commuting patterns. Given these pre-existing 
complexities, how closely should devolution 
deals be aligned to existing geographic 
frameworks and how much does it matter? 
The geography of places also has an 
impact on how easy devolution deals are 
to construct. It is easy to have a strong 
identity if there is no nearby competition and 
your city-region has an obvious boundary. 
However, one borough leader described being 
“pulled in all directions”, with the “Northern 
Powerhouse” to their north, and another major 
deal to the East. This, they felt, undermined 
the spatial integrity and identity of their own 
bid. In a two-tier authority, a leader said that 
his district is on the border of many dominant 
city-regions, and they have been asked to join 
four separate devolution deals. 
It is easy for relatively centralised urban 
places to act as a legitimate centre for 
a wider region. But consider combined 
authorities where two dominant cities act as 
dual centres. What problems or opportunities 
does this afford? Taken further, there may be 
Combined Authorities under two-tier counties 
who have a rural population with several 
small towns and cities of roughly equal size. 
Creating a coherent place identity for some 
devolution deals can thus be problematic.
However, residents themselves transcend 
geographical boundaries all the time. Many 
will work in one borough and live in another, 
reflecting the true functional economic areas, 
reflected in the TTWA. Understanding the 
economic geographies, led by evidence, may 
reduce the complaint that certain boroughs 
get more than others. A coherent story about 
place that residents see reflects their own 
lives and priorities is vital to success. 
The geographies of the devolution deals 
then are varied, from established city-regions 
that have a long history of collaboration, 
to new ones that are seeking to define a 
new geography. Thus it seems they are an 
intermediate tier between the small LEP 
areas and the old large RDAs, known as 
a ‘mezzanine’ level7. In essence they are 
creating a sub-regional plan, with more 
realistic geographies, driven from a more 
bottom-up approach than the RDAs.
COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
A leader of a combined authority stated that 
“everything that happened in [their authority] 
has happened through good collaboration” 
7  IPPR North (2014) Decentralisation Decade p.53
6between each partner organisation in the 
combined authority. But this authority has had 
several years of collaboration between what 
are now its constituent boroughs and so has 
had a long time to build up good relations 
relative to other combined authorities who are 
newly coming together and vying for deals. 
Good collaboration doesn’t happen overnight. 
Nevertheless, moves towards a collaborative 
model between boroughs can open up a new 
culture of working, enabling a better response 
to local challenges. 
Multiple authorities of course have divergent 
interests, notwithstanding differences in their 
social, political and economic compositions. 
But sometimes a strong evidence base can 
help overcome political issues. For example, 
evidence produced from one borough 
showed that in order to achieve economic 
growth, they should improve human capital 
such as skills and levels of social exclusion. 
When other boroughs saw the clarity of 
this evidence, it provided an extra stimulus 
to help shape the public services reform 
agenda within their combined authority. This 
meant that despite their social and economic 
differences, and local interests, the strong 
evidence enabled all authorities to agree on a 
common agenda for tackling social problems 
across the combined authority. 
There are different types of leadership 
models for combined authorities. These 
range from civic mayors for example who act 
as figureheads, or more powerful executive 
mayors as is the case within Greater London. 
Greater Manchester, the most established 
authority has a number of councils with 
strong local identities, each with their own 
leader. Under their governance framework, 
prior to devolution, there existed a chair of the 
combined authority who steered the group, 
but was not able to make executive decisions. 
There will be an election of a mayor in 2017, 
but currently the board of the authority must 
have broad consensus on strategic issues 
to make decisions, with at least 7 out of 10 
members having to agree on plans for them 
to go forward. Although this may be seen as 
a ‘weak’ mayoral model since there isn’t a 
strong leader, its strength lies in the fact that 
it is consensus based. 
There are advantages to having a visible 
face of the authority. This both gives voters 
a democratic accountability – someone to 
hold responsible for decisions made but also 
presents an opportunity to represent the 
area on the national and international stage. 
London, Wales and Scotland already have 
these voices as devolved administrations, 
so it’s important that the English cities 
and regions have that too. Such a role 
has benefits of attracting attention to the 
authority, but the flip side is the risk that 
national government can offload responsibility 
for unfortunate or unpopular decisions to the 
authority and the mayor representing it. 
It is also important to note that at present, the 
government are making it very clear that their 
devolution plans depend on a commitment 
from combined authorities that there will be 
7a directly elected mayor. It will be up to the 
authorities and the individual chosen to lead 
them how they make that work. 
PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM
Where devolution deals have worked, they 
have enabled public sector reform in ways 
that central government departments can’t. 
Working on policy areas as diverse as 
treatment of young offenders, elderly care, 
mental health and early years, it was noted 
that acute social issues are best tackled by 
local decision-makers. Sometimes within 
an area you might find a few families who 
cost millions of pounds each year in health, 
benefits and housing. A centrally driven 
departmental approach won’t be able to 
overcome these entrenched problems. But 
local services offering a joined up, locally 
coordinated approach make it much easier 
to have a positive impact on people’s lives 
as well as making savings by avoiding 
duplication of provision.
Many have previously claimed that a 
combined authority would have to be “mad” 
to have a devolved health budget. However, 
since some combined authorities had very 
specific health needs. One such example 
had found that its centrally run NHS services 
delivered some of the worst health outcomes 
in the country. The authority have started to 
bring health and social care into the same 
decision making process, breaking down 
departmental silos, taking a system that was 
failing and changing it. This shows how public 
service reform runs alongside devolution to 
improve outcomes and services for users. 
Combined authorities can also address 
broader issues that feed into health outcomes 
such as ensuring decent housing, good diets 
and all-round well-being. For example, the 
first time mental health trusts in one particular 
authority sat down together in a meeting, 
was with members from their local crime 
commission. This highlights the ways in which 
individual services had been caught between 
departmental structures and the ways in 
which devolution deals can bring players 
together in a better way. 
 
 
FISCAL DEVOLUTION
It is hard to see how these reforms can be 
implemented through a combined authority 
without some form of fiscal devolution. It was 
acknowledged that any form of partial fiscal 
devolution, for example, the forthcoming 
power to retain business rates, could 
lead to complex issues around necessary 
redistribution within a combined authority. 
There is likely to be a core authority which 
contains the business district of that region 
and thus brings in a very high proportion 
of business rate receipts. But such core 
authorities would not function without the 
workers, who often come from areas with 
8much lower business rate income. We 
should therefore look at combined authorities 
as functional economic systems, with net 
contributing financial authorities pooling with 
net recipient residential authorities. Not only 
would this help align finances with economic 
areas, but would also help to alleviate tension 
between boroughs. 
If pooling did not happen, some members 
negatively anticipated competitive lowering 
of rates between boroughs to attract more 
businesses. Ultimately we don’t want 
a situation where a race to the bottom 
“assures our mutual destruction” said one 
Borough Chief. As others have said, a proper 
assessment of Travel to Work Areas would be 
useful to address this8.
Future financial levers were also considered. 
Control over council tax would help to give 
more power to boroughs with low business 
rates, and would also contribute to the overall 
availability of money in the funding pool. Other 
ideas for raising money locally have included 
property taxes such as stamp duty and hotel 
taxes. Co-designing tax systems with central 
government was also considered but this 
would require a new relationship between 
combined authorities and the Treasury that is 
not currently on the table.
 
 
8  IPPR North (2014) Decentralisation Decade p.9
CONCLUSION
Devolution in England is not a new concept, 
and devolution deals have emerged from a 
combination of LEPs, experience of city deals, 
and within the growing framework around 
combined authorities. Key themes which 
emerged at the roundtable centred on how to 
define geographies, what leadership models 
work best, public services reform and fiscal 
devolution. The roundtable reflected a spectrum 
of authorities in varying stages of devolution. 
Ultimately these themes are inter-related. A 
clear geographic area and identity allows the 
discussion of fiscal devolution to take place. 
This is why collaborative governance is so 
important. Some combined authorities will 
have more complex geographic barriers than 
others, but working in collaboration with a 
view to clear objectives across the authority, 
can overcome these challenges.
Working in a collaborative fashion also 
makes it likely that public service reform will 
be implemented as authorities seek ways 
to overcome the silo thinking that is both 
typical and derivative of central departmental 
processes. Focusing on people and places, 
allows us to see the impacts of such thinking, 
and evidence to date has shown how place-
based approaches enable more joined-up 
delivery methods.
All of these themes are underpinned by 
fiscal devolution which demands a clear 
9understanding of economic geographies 
and enables public sector reform through 
a collaborative model of working. The 
challenge for combined authorities in going 
ahead with devolution deals is being clear 
on what outcomes they want to achieve, 
and presenting a convincing case to the 
government to give them the appropriate 
tools to do so. In return, central government 
must trust combined authorities and release 
more fiscal powers to enable them to realise 
their ambitions. After all, devolution that is 
reliant upon the centre for its fiscal and policy 
authority, is not real devolution at all.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE VIEW FROM 
WEIGHTMANS: WHERE NEXT 
FOR DEVOLUTION?
SIMON GOACHER
PARTNER AND HEAD OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT, WEIGHTMANS LLP
Devolution is an idea whose time has come.  
It has been a key feature of the government’s 
agenda to promote growth and provide some 
coherence to the development of strategy and 
infrastructure on a regional footprint. But as we 
press on towards elected mayors for regional 
combined authorities in May 2017 doubts 
remain about how effective they will be and 
whether they will work outside of the core cities.
Manchester has blazed the trail when it 
comes to devolution. It was clear from the 
roundtable that this has been greatly assisted 
by the history of joint working in Greater 
Manchester. This has given them strong 
foundations and there is an obvious ethos 
of collaboration for the benefit of the area as 
a whole, recognising that there needs to be 
something in it for everyone to make it work.
What is equally clear is that devolution 
is difficult without that history and even 
more difficult in two tier areas and where 
the geography creates more confusion. 
There are a number of county councils 
with district authorities pulling towards 
10
different conurbations. This makes it virtually 
impossible to create a compelling case for 
a combined authority on existing or even 
slightly expanded administrative footprints.
It could be argued that this does not matter; it 
is the geography that works which should be 
applied.  But in the absence of any consensus 
or even criteria about how you determine the 
right geography for a combined authority then 
it is unsurprising that this has led to reported 
difficulties in reaching agreement. The two 
most recently announced deals cover the East 
and the West of England, the uninitiated could 
be forgiven for thinking that these deals should 
cover the whole country between them! 
Weightmans were delighted to partner with 
NLGN to host a roundtable to discuss this 
very issue. The participants reflected the 
mood of local government as a whole on 
the devolution agenda, positive about the 
opportunity with some concern about the 
detail. This is supported by a general view that 
trying to apply what works for core cities does 
not translate to counties and more rural areas 
very easily. With the first round of mayoral 
elections for combined authorities due in May 
2017 we will not have to wait long to see how 
the devolution revolution develops.
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